In recent years, with the continuous development of significant data industrialization, trajectory data have more and more critical analytical value for urban construction and environmental monitoring. However, the trajectory contains a lot of personal privacy, and rashly publishing trajectory data set will cause serious privacy leakage risk. At present, the privacy protection of trajectory data mainly uses the methods of data anonymity and generalization, without considering the background knowledge of attackers and ignores the risk of adjacent location points may leak sensitive location points. In this paper, based on the above problems, combined with the location correlation of trajectory data, we proposed a plausible replacement method. First, the correlation of trajectory points is proposed to classify the individual trajectories containing sensitive points. Then, according to the relevance of location points and the randomized response mechanism, a reasonable candidate set is selected to replace the sensitive points in the trajectory to satisfy the locally differential privacy. Theoretical and experimental results show that the proposed method not only protects the sensitive information of individuals but also does not affect the overall data distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the increasing popularity of GPS-enabled mobile devices, network communications and wearable sensors has greatly accelerated the development of location-based services (LBS) and e-commerce [1] , resulting in massive amounts of trajectory data. These trajectory data refer to the set of temporal points that the user visits, and a series of Web pages that are browsed in chronological order. Using location trajectory data can help government agencies make more informed urban planning and avoid traffic jams, using web browsing records can be more customized to provide users with personalized services. However, these original trajectory data may include the user's personalized sensitive points, for example, the patient regards the hospital as a sensitive point, but the doctor may not. Key management ([2]- [4] ) is essential for security and privacy. To meet the personalized privacy needs of users, the trajectory data must be processed before released, and the sensitive points and related points should be hidden.
A great deal of work has been done on how to conduct privacy protection while mining association rules [5] and frequent itemsets [6] . However, they can-not be applied to the personal trajectory data directly because the trajectory data are multiple location points in chronological order. Among them, works in [7] adopt a suppression approach by removing the individual sensitive item, e.g., locations or web pages. Loukides and Grigorios [8] adopt a generalization approach to replace fine-grained data with coarse-grained data. Works in [9] adopt a permutation approach which re-arranges the ordering of items in each sensitive pattern in the released sequence. The drawback of suppression-based approaches is the data loss inflicted by deleting item in the released data, especially when sensitive patterns are frequent patterns. The generalization-based approaches can-not handle with attackers with strong background knowledge. Combined with the context, the probability of speculating on a sensitive item may increase. The permutation-based approaches break the inherent ordering in the sequential data and create ''ghost'' patterns that do not exist in the original database.
To the best of my knowledge, [10] is the article most similar to ours, which also protects sensitive points from the opponents with strong background knowledge. Their method provides two privacy checks to decide whether to release or suppress the user's current location. The output is limited to the user's current position or suppression symbol. In other words, for the output sequence L 1 → L 2 → ⊥ → L 3 , the attacker can see the sensitive point is between L 2 and L 3 . Combined with the context, the probability of speculating on sensitive item may increase.
Inspired by [11] , this paper proposes Lclean, which applies locally differential privacy to the privacy protection of sensitive points in trajectory data, which makes it impossible for attackers to infer the sensitive information of users in the original trajectory data through the published trajectory data. We assume that the users set sensitive point sets themselves, and Lclean obtains these sensitive points as inputs. However, the adjacent points may also leak sensitive points, sensitive points and these sequences which may lead to the leakage of sensitive information are called sensitive regions. Our goal is to prevent any formidable attackers from inferring the user's sensitive information without affecting the data distribution too much. In this paper, we propose to replace sensitive regions with non-sensitive sequences. The replacement length depends on the correlation between sensitive points and their adjacent points. Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) We propose to apply locally differential privacy to protect sensitive points in individual trajectories without affecting the usability of the overall trajectory. (2) We propose a randomized response mechanism k-RI based on k-RR to replace the sensitive regions with other non-sensitive sequences, which do not restrict the attacker's background knowledge. (3) We propose a novel notion,i.e., the correlation between sensitive points and their adjacent points. The strength of the correlation determines the replacement length, and if the correlation is strong, the strong correlation sequence need to be replaced. conversely, replace the sensitive point. In the remaining of the paper, Section 2 reviews recent related works, Section 3 covers some definitions and theorems. Section 4 contains our proposed solutions. Section 5 provides experimental results. Section 6 concludes the paper and states future research directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
At present, the release of trajectory data can be divided into two categories. The first category is designed to handle the release of a trajectory dataset containing a large number of trajectories, each of which can be thought of as a record. The second type [12] aims to publish a single trajectory, treating each point in the trajectory as a single record. The biggest difference between these two categories is that the first type is the entire trajectory of the protection, while the second one is the single location. Several papers (e.g., [13] - [15] ) have studied related privacy issues. In this article, we combine two approaches to publish a dataset that contains a large number of trajectories while protecting a user's single sensitive location.
K-anonymity based on trajectory generalization has been prevailing for its good balance of privacy protection and data availability. In [16] , a (k, δ) anonymous algorithm was proposed for trajectory dataset publication. Based on trajectory generalization and k-anonymity, this algorithm generalized every position in the trajectory to a circle with a radius of δ, and make sure that each circle has at least k points to satisfy k-anonymity, each of which is represented by a cylinder of these circles. In [17] , a data suppression technique was proposed to limit the probability of speculation of sensitive locations by assuming the attacker's background knowledge. The literature [18] considered the scenario in which users' privacy attributes were distributed with trajectory data. A (K,C)L-privacy model was proposed, where L represents the longest sub-trajectory length assumed by an attacker. The model can resist the re-identification of track data attacks and attribute attacks. However, as mentioned above, all of the techniques above for privacy distribution based on k-anonymity trajectory data set need to assume the background of the attacker, and the quantitative comparison between the different models for privacy protection can-not be made.
Differential privacy [19] was quickly applied to the privacy protection of data publishing based on fake data technology to achieve privacy protection by adding noise to the real data set. In data distribution, differential privacy can achieve different levels of privacy protection and data publishing accuracy by adjusting the privacy parameter ε. In general, the larger the value of ε, the lower the level of privacy protection and the higher the accuracy of the published dataset. The first common mechanism for implementing differential privacy is the Laplacian mechanism proposed in [20] . This mechanism mainly focuses on numeric queries. By adding random noise obeying Laplace distribution to the results of real queries. For non-numeric queries, [21] proposed an exponential mechanism, which is the second universal mechanism to achieve differential privacy.
Reference [10] has the same purpose as our paper and protects the sensitive points of individual users while ensuring the availability of the published trajectory dataset. They provide two privacy check methods to decide whether to release or suppress the user's current location. They limit the output to real or suppressed symbols. Unfortunately, it is possible to extrapolate sensitive location information based on the suppression of symbols combined with the attacker's strong background knowledge.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the symbols and related definitions used in this paper are given. Finally, formally defines the trajectory replacement problem.
A. LOCATION TRAJECTORY
A Location Trajectory is the sequence of successive spatiotemporal points produced by a particular user for a period, and it is presented as:
. . , loc n } where loc i represents the Points of Interest(POI). In the real trajectory dataset, every POI corresponds to a timestamp.
In this paper, the timestamp is not taken into account when locating the sensitive region. However, when determining the candidate set, whether the replacement point meets the region reachability is judged by combining the timestamp.
B. CORRELATION OF LOCATION POINTS
Consider loc i as a sensitive point, if it is known that the previous location or next location can increase the probability of the attackers guess, presented as:
We call it a strong correlation sequence, where P (loc t ) is the probability of the attackers' random guess with the context presented as: max {0.5, c (loc t ) /N }, where c (loc t ) is the number of users who have been to loc t and N is the total number of users. P (loc t |loc t−1 ) is the probability of the attackers' inference with the previous location loc t−1 presented as:
Consider a setting where there are n records; a randomized algorithm M is ε-locally differential privacy if and only if any two input t and t t, t ∈ Dom (M ) , and for any possible
where the probability is taken over the randomness of M .
D. RANDOMIZED RESPONSE
Randomized response technology is the mainstream perturbation mechanism of locally differential privacy. According to Kairouz et al., A gradient response technique, k-RR [23] , is proposed to overcome the problem that the randomized response technique is directed to binary variables. For the case that there are k(k>2) candidate variables can also directly use randomized response. k-RR requires consistent input and output range.In this paper, k-RI is proposed to satisfy the outputs contained in the inputs. The random response algorithm shows the output of different inputs as follows:
R and R are input and output of the algorithm respectively. To make the algorithm satisfy ε-locally differential privacy, we calculate P by the following formula:
So we adjust the randomized response mechanism to:
If the input R does not belong to the output set, then an output is selected randomly from the output set; otherwise, the probability response to the real result is e ε / (k − 1 + e ε ), and any of the other k − 1 results is 1/ (k − 1 + e ε ) to satisfy the locally differential privacy.
E. UTILITY LOSS
The published trajectory data should be consistent with the original data distribution as much as possible, and the utility loss is defined below, which is also the most important evaluations in this experiment.
1) KL-DIVERGENCE
For each sensitive region j to be replaced, X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } is the candidate set. loc p is the previous location of the sensitive region which is called parent node, loc r is the next location of a sensitive region which is called root node. For any x ∈ X ∪ S j , the occurrence probability of loc p → x → loc r in original trajectory data is P j (x), and transformed into Q j (x) in the published trajectory. We define the kl-divergence of each sensitive region j as follows:
Overall utility loss:
2) TRAJECTORY SIMILARITY [24] Assuming that A = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i } represents the original trajectory, B = {n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n i } represents the processed trajectory, and the trajectory similarity between A and B is as follows: A, B) and max Diff (A, B) are the minimum distance and the maximum distance between A and B.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL
In this section, we present the design of the proposed plausible approach for individual trajectory Sanitization. The overview framework is shown in Figure 1 , that implements the end-to-end system from original trajectories and sensitive set to privacy-preserving trajectories. The original trajectory and individual sensitive points are used as the input of the whole substitution mechanism, and the sensitive points are located to determine the set of sensitive regions to be replaced. The output of the previous step is used as the input to determine the candidate set. The randomized response makes the algorithm satisfy ε-locally differential privacy. 
A. DETERMINE SENSITIVE REGIONS
In this subsection, we present the algorithm to perform the determine sensitive regions for original trajectory data. First, we get the sensitive point index to extract the sequence containing the sensitive points. Secondly, we determine the correlation between the sensitive points and the adjacent points. If the correlation is strong, The strong correlation sequence should be replaced, on the contrary, just replace the sensitive points. Determine sensitive region algorithm (DSR) is described as follows: Assuming that the attacker has strong background knowledge, he can do the query in the entire dataset. According to the definition in section 2, sensitive regions are obtained by calculating the correlation between each sensitive point and its adjacent points(lines 3-7).
B. DETERMINE CANDIDATE SET
The output from the previous subsection along with the original trajectory data are used as input to this subsection. Non-sensitive regions of the same parent and child nodes as the sensitive region are found as candidate set by subsequence matching. This subsection considers the timestamp when determining whether a candidate set, that is to determine whether a candidate meets the spatiotemporal accessibility is judged by combining the timestamp.
where δ is the maximum speed of a human. Assume the length of the sensitive region is n, the length of candidate sequence is no more than n. Determine candidate set algorithm(DCS) is described as follows: The candidate set should satisfy three rules: 1) having the same parent node and child node as the sensitive region(line 2); 2) each candidate is weakly connected to the parent node and child node (line 3); 3) A candidate value should satisfy the spatio-temporal accessibility with the parent and child nodes(line 4).
C. PRIVACY REPLACEMENT MECHANISM
Now we get the candidate set for each sensitive region, the algorithm in this subsection applies the randomized response mechanism k-RI, which makes it impossible for the attacker to predict sensitive region with the replaced trajectory accurately. That is to say; our algorithm meets ε-locally differential privacy. Above all, we assume that all k candidate sets are diverse from each other. For the candidate set containing duplicate values, the results also meet ε-locally differential privacy. The privacy replacement algorithm (PRA) is described as follows:
Algorithm 3 PRA Input: original trajectory dataset D, The candidate set CS, ε Output: noisy trajectory dataset D r 1. ε = ε/ |CS|; 2. For each S j ∈ S u 3. For each seq i ∈ CS j : 4. Algorithm A determine the relationship between seq i and the former location and the correlation between seq i and the latter location. 5. If(weak correlation) 6. K = CS j , find a seq i ∈ CS j as the input,according to the formula 4-1,the possibility of output seq i is e ε / (k − 1 + e ε ), and the possibility of picking one randomly from the rest is 1/ (k − 1 + e ε ). 7. Replace the sensitive area with the output.
Return D r
This subsection implements the substitution work for each sensitive region. First, we divide the privacy budget. The candidate set:
The size of CS is the number of sensitive regions to be replaced. Therefore, the privacy budget for each sensitive region is ε/ |CS| to ensure that the entire trajectory meets ε-locally differential privacy. This equal division of the privacy budget is called the average privacy replacement(BR). Each candidate is evaluated for correlation before replacement to ensure that weakly correlated after the replacement(line3-5). Line6 implements locally differential privacy replacement, and the output of randomly response mechanism is used as the final replacement value.
D. PROPORTIONAL PRIVACY REPLACEMENT
In the previous subsection, to guarantee the locally differential privacy of the entire trajectory, we first assign an average privacy budget when replacing each sensitive region. In this section we give a ratio-based allocation of the privacy budget(RatioR).
Where | CSj | is the candidate set size for the jth sensitive region. In the real trajectory, the size of candidate set for each sensitive region to be replaced varies from region to region. In this section, the region to be replaced with fewer candidates is allocated smaller privacy budget to ensure a stronger degree of privacy protection and more privacy budget for larger candidates.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To simulate the location trajectory anonymization we have used the Gowalla check-in dataset. This dataset was collected by almost 200000 users, and it contains 650000 trajectories. To verify the utility of our method, we first define a baseline method [10] in which the sensitive points (sequences) are published in the form of ⊥. The utility loss function defined in Section 3 is taken as our experimental evaluation target: KL-divergence. We compare our average privacy replacement (BR) and the ratio-based privacy replacement (RatioR) with the baseline method under different privacy budgets.
A. KL-DIVERGENCE
Based on the KL-divergence metric in Section 3, the error between the replaced trajectory data and the original trajectory data is quantified. In this paper, we replace and add noise to multiple sensitive regions, thus the practicality measure in this subsection is evaluated separately for each sensitive region. For any sensitive region to be replaced, the candidate set is CS j , the probability of outputting any one of the candidate set is:
We adjust the KL-divergence formula to:
Where ct loc p → c i → loc l represents the number of occurrences of loc p → c i → loc l in the trajectory dataset, ct loc p → * → loc l represents the number of locations that the previous location is loc p and the next location is loc l . Figure 2 shows the utility loss compared with the privacy replacement method BR and RatioR. The abscissa is the number of the sensitive region to be replaced, and the ordinate is the utility loss of DKL. It can be seen from the figure that the loss of utility of our average privacy replacement method (BR) and the ratio-based privacy replacement method (RatioR) is lower than that of the baseline method. For the point of 3 and 10, the utility loss is slightly higher than the baseline method. This is a result of having a too small candidate set, which will lead to a great fluctuation with a certain value changes. Also, we can see from the experiment that RatioR increases the degree of protection for each sensitive region and thus reduces its practicability, the possible loss DKL j increases slightly.
The utility loss of the entire trajectory is shown in Figure 3 below: As shown in the figure, the abscissa is the value of the privacy budget. It can be seen from Figure 3 (a) that as the privacy budget increases, the practicality of the overall trajectory data increases slightly. From Figure b , we can see that the utility loss of our two methods is significantly lower than the baseline method. The experimental results show that our average privacy replacement method (BR) and the ratiobased privacy replacement method (RatioR) meet ε-locally differential privacy while maintaining better practicality.
B. TRAJECTORY SIMILARITY
Based on the trajectory similarity metric in Section 3, the similarity between the replaced trajectory data and the original trajectory data is quantified. We change the privacy parameter ε and conduct multiple experiments to get the average. Figure 4 shows the trajectory similarity results with the privacy replacement method BR and RatioR. As shown in the figure, the abscissa is the value of the privacy budget. It can be seen that as the privacy budget increases, the similarity value increases. We can see that when ε increases from 0.1 to 0.3, the trajectory similarity increases greatly, but there was no significant change from 0.3 to 0.7. The experimental results show that the released trajectory under ratio-based privacy replacement method (RatioR) is more similar to the original trajectory.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented Lclean, a system that uses substitution as a mechanism to protect sensitive points of an individual. Instead of random substitution of sensitive regions, which can degrade the utility of the overall datasets, we perform a privacy substitution mechanism with a randomized response. We employ an average privacy substitution and a ratio-based privacy substitution to meet the ε-locally differential privacy while maintaining the consistency of release trajectory. Through experimentation on real-life check-in trajectory datasets, we demonstrated that our two privacy substitution strategies could indeed be used for preserving the utility of processed data while achieving ε-locally differential privacy. In future, we have the plan to work on multi-user trajectory privacy protection, considering the connection between different users' sensitive points and make it difficult to figure out person sensitive information.
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